Myth as science fiction, a reply to De Heusch by Beek, W.E.A. van
MYTH AS SCIENCE FICTION, A REPLY TO DE HEUSCH
Walter E.A, van Beek
University of Utrecht
Luc De Heusch's reaction to my article on the restudy of Griaule brought out some interesting
points, that do deserve further attention and discussion. It also shows an intensity of emotional
involvement on his part that does blur some relevant arguments. Knowing thé deep loyalties hivolved
around Griaule, both by his close collaborators (Dieterlen), his kinspeople (Calame-Griaule) and his
disciples (such as De Heusch) and after reading Meillassoux's comment on French académie culture,
such a reaction is to be expected. Still, a few a priori corrections are called for. De Heusch treats an
académie discussion as a trial, with me claiming to be judge, jury and hangman. On the other hand
he calls me 'Reverend', maybe trying to discrédit me as an anthropologist. I am not a reverend, nor
a theologian, but a professional anthropologist, trained as such. The whole judicial terminology is out
of order. My aim in thé restudy is and has been to open a discussion about a topic that too long has
been closed: thé ethnographie validity of thé Griaule publications. I hâve waited sometime before
doing so, because of thé emotional tensions that would be generated. Still, science is a discourse,
even when it is sensitive; I feit I could not remain silent till a less hurtful date. Throughout thé
article I expressed my respect for thé pioneering contributions of Griaule. While criticizing him on
ethnographie grounds, I think I did him more justice in thé rôle he really excelled in (and wished to
excel in): as an adventurer and above ail as a writer. So, if Griaule's intellectual progeny finds my
analysis uncomfortable, it may be because adventure has seeped out of the discipline and good
writers are scarce. For thé Heusch thé literary style of Dieu d'Eau (DE) detracts from its
ethnographie value. Though I concur with De Heusch in his critique of DE, I do think Griaule's
style is more than a device; it is at thé heart of his ethnographie endeavour. His ami was to write a
story and so he did, very well. When thé différence between his subséquent books (and of course Le
Renard Pale (RP) is for a considérable part thé work of Dieterlen) had to be explained, thé notion
of initiatory stages was created, which is not recognizable for thé Dogon.
De Heusch's main argument hinges on thé notion of hidden myth, and thé possibility of an
immanent cosmology. The Dogon are, also for De Heusch, 'exceptional', if only because their System
of classification is 'so meticulous'. He compares this with Pierre Smith's description of Rwanda
proscriptions, covering all aspects of social life. Many other similar examples could be given, with
intricate classifications, tied in to a variety of social parameters; Victor Turner's and Mary Douglas'
works are füll of those. There are, however, some crucial différences between thèse Systems and that
as described by Griaule in DE and RP. First, thé latter classifications do not, in fact, correspond
with social parameters, and if correspondences are indicated, mainly in DE, they hâve no empirical
foundation. Secondly, in their detailed and seamless coverage, thé DE and RP classifications are still
unmatched in ethnographie literature. Even within the field of symbolics they are an anomaly.
The issue of immanence is pertinent. Turner's analysis of hidden myth is important, and often
relevant in Africa. But not for thé Dogon material, as Griaule does not use anything other than myth
itself as a primai source. He definitely does not start with a description and analysis of ritual, nor do
ritual éléments feature in his analysis or his production of thé myth. In fact, if Griaule would hâve
deducted the myths from the rituals, he would hâve wound up with a totally différent - and in my
view definitely non-cosmological - set of interprétations; this is just what I try to do in my analysis, as
any anthropologist who interprets ritual. The bits and pièces Griaule (and Dieterlen) worked with
are not the rituals, nor are they the 'notes, sketches or fragments' Turner mentions; on the contrary,
the building blocks of Griaule's analysis were created during his interviews, tailor-made for him. The
clearest example is thé grand majority of thé drawings which were produced for thé occasion (and
therefore later forgotten in their explanation by informants). So the absence of a storyline in thé
Griaule mythology indeed is a problem, and Griaule and Dieterlen should not only have noted the
absence but recognized it as a major obstacle.
As for thé importance of thé symbolic dimension, I do not belittle its importance (nor its rôle in
future anthropology). But I do claim that symbolic dimensions should be studied in relation to
historical, political and sociological parameters, which in fact has been the mainstay of anthropology
since long. This is exactly what Griaule did not do; for Griaule thé myth served as thé explanans, not
the explanandum. In Dieterlen's analysis of masks the same strategy surfaces (Dieterlen, 1989): the
myths find expression in the details of the masquerade, without any sociological, ecological or
political référence. In fact, De Heusch concurs on this, as hè writes that 'myths are not the keystone
in the Dogon social structure, as Griaule and Dieterlen have sometimes imprudently implied'. More
often than 'sometimes'.
This, of course, bears on the concept of myth itself. Somehow de Heusch seems to have gained the
impression that for me myths should be unchanging, time-honoured tales, fully authentic and
untouched by foreign hands. Not at all so, as I did make clear hi the article. I consider the search
for an authentic myth as the quest for the Holy Grail: an unattainable goal leading into an
unproductive pursuit. Myths do represent social changes, political influences, individual goals and
sometimes reflect history, and I fully recognize - and relish - their créative and adaptive dimensions.
The very first article I wrote on the Dogon treats this aspect (Van Beek 1981). The shoe is on the
other foot, in fact. Fürst of all, as with many oral traditions, the Dogon in their crucial notion of tem
(tradition , 'that what is found') imply just such an authentic, unchangeable base. Even in the case of
evident adaptations, 'tradition' invokes authenticity and absence of change. This, as said, is no
exception at all. However, Griaule and Dieterlen identify with this emic Dogon définition of myth
and tradition, and implicitly as well as explicitly define the myths as authentic, fully and wholly
Dogon, disregarding any influences from outside on the Dogon. In effect, if any similarities between,
say, Dogon and Bambara are in évidence, they explain these by referring to a genera! old Sudanese
culture, of which the Dogon are one of the more faithful représentatives. So it is the French Dogon
ethnography who is questing for the Holy Grail; if not, they would have easily recognized many
influences from e.g. biblical sources. For me there is no 'true Dogon' myth or religion, and my
opening agreement with tenets of heuristic anthropology should have been clear enough. Therefore,
I stated the problem of ethnographie validity in terms of recognizability and I still think that is where
it résides. Griaule's tales are unrecognizable for Dogon informants, even in Sanga. So, even if there
are no 'true Dogon tales', some tales are definitely not Dogon.
At the end of his comment, de Heusch mentions the complicated character of Dogon rituals, and
tries to reduce my remarks on them to some ethnographie simplicities. This is not relevant: I
nowhere underestimated the complexities of, say, the mask rituals; the bush - village distinction,
though highly relevant, does not exhaust the polysemy of the dama at all. But, again, that polysemy
cannot be honoured in an article, especially not in a discussion article; it has to be the subject of a
monograph, as Douglas rightly insisted.
De Heusch accuses me of doing away with a gréât body of ethnographie material, in order to make
sensé in a chaos of contradiction. No, my informants did away with thé myths, and when acquainted
with thé Griaule myths, pointed out the contradictions in them, explaining them away as
constructions (or simply 'lies'). Not only informants from Tireli, but also informants from Sanga, and
among them also informants who hâve worked and were still working with Dieterlen. The latter ones
were particularly keen in pointing out the contradictions in thé data. In explaining away thé texts,
they referred to thé créative abilities of the individuals who had instructed or translated for Griaule
at the time. Anyway, De Heusch hère wants to eat his cake and hâve it: on the one hand hè défends
both thé DE and RP texts, while on thé other hand he dismisses DE as an 'enigma', possibly a
black-smith version. The latter suggestion, though interesting, cannot be validated. Ogotemelli was
not a blacksmith, while there are blacksmiths among thé RP informant-circle. Moreover, thé spécifie
blacksmiths traditions that can be traced, hâve no bearing on création, just on migration historiés
and on technical and ritual knowledge1. So, De Heusch makes a similar distinction as I do, e.g.
dismisses one text as 'enigmatic, problematic and trouble some 'in order to save another one.
How indigenous are thé new inventions of Griaule's informants, De Heusch's next question, is a
crucial one. Delving into thé almost famous dung beetles De Heusch suggests that Griaule's
informants followed the parameters of their own classificatory System. In a way, that is évident
indeed. Their referral to certain animais and spécifie colours are definitely Dogon: they used thé
Dogon terms at their disposai. However, thé point is that this did not stem - nor needed to stem -
from a 'classificatory mania' at ail. The other Dogon, when confronted with this classification, simply
roared with laughter - which is ail thé more convincing in such a polite society. Though thé people
who had told Griaule this were old, thus commanding respect, this was too much, this was fully
ridiculous. So as far as it is Dogon, it is a Dogon joke.
In his next sections De Heusch, without stating as much, investigates what can be saved from thé
ethnography. He agrées that Griaule erred in presenting a breachless system and goes into some
ethnographie detail. On the whole I only have problems with his analysis when hè mixes sources.
One example: Lèbè is important in the Hogon complex, but the identification of Lèbè as a first
ancestor is neither needed for explanation nor recognized as such by the informants (not even by the
Sanga-ones!). Lèbè is much more than an underworld counterpart of Ama -1 never said that - hè is
a supernatural being 'm his own right. And the ecological relevance of the buro ritual is important in
its symbolism, and quite straightforward. It is when cosmology is brought in that the problem starts.
The same holds for Nomma, also an important Dogon deity. Even more than Lèbè he is drawn by
Griaule into a grandiose, non-Dogon scheme, in which Christian éléments gradually émerge. That
Dogon éléments (menstruation, twins) continue to figure is just as evident, and does not at all
detract from the bricolage aspect the myths. Of course, the informants used Dogon éléments in their
constructions. But the informants were not the only ones introducing foreign aspects. Griaule in his
analysis removed the data even further from their socio-cultural milieu. And when re-analysing the
myths also De Heusch takes the Griaule myths from their social and ecological context. When hè
invokes the Brahmanic model in order to explain the Griaule tales, one is clearly out of Africa. De
Heusch's interprétation of Nommo's blood in comparison with Christ's blood is in effect a nice pièce
of theology, but it brings us way out of Dogon country, beyond Dogon récognition. Also the
etymology hè cites of yuguru (serpent) and yurugu (fox) is not recognized at all by the informants,
not even by Dieterlen's informants.
Finally, the question of genius. First, enough time elapsed between 1931 and 1954 to allow for
creative intégration of new éléments, Christian or other. Then, the reworking of models - in RP
disguised as levels of knowledge - is a common human way of thinking, in fact the basis of
structuralism! Half fictional (or pseudo-empirical) créations such as DE and RP are not beyond
human reach. For instance many science-fiction or fantasy writers hâve performed similar and even
more elaborate tales of the past and thé future: Tolkien's work, from thé hobbits to Silmarillion, or
Heinlein's 'Future-History' bear ail thé Griaule characteristics: a progressive unfolding of an ever
more grandiose scheme, a widening of thé creative horizon, use of more remote additional sources
and a graduai intégration of previously unconnected players. In thé best sensé of the word, DE and
RP are science-fiction and stand among thé gréât pseudo-empiric fictions of the world. Not beyond
human reach, not beyond thé reach of thé Dogon or Griaule. Thèse 'paroles étonnantes' (a nice
French translation for science-fiction by the way) should indeed not be rejected, I am adamant on
that in thé article. They are works of intercultural art and should be read as such.
NOTES
1. In thé discussion with Mary Douglas in Guttural Anthropology 32 (2) a confusion of thé names
of (Meyer) Fortes and (Daryll) Forde resulted in some misunderstanding. The discussant (and
friend) of Dieterlen was Fortes, who by thé way always bas been critical to Griaule's
mythopoetic Dogon interprétations.
2. De Heusch's challenge to name an example of structural comparison of unconnected myths, is
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